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where tensions are high, limiting armaments or ceasing controversial weapons development programs may only become possible after considerable confidence building in other areas. Table   I illustrates potential discussion topics for regional arms control and confidence building measures. 
Regional Versus Global
Many regional discussions occur against a backdrop of multilateral or global arms control initiatives. In such cases, the question of the relationship of the regional to the global agreement often arises. Many arms control analysts emphasize the over-riding importance of global agreements, especially those which concern nuclear issues, and stress that regional agreements should be embedded in a global context. However, regional agreements can have advantages over their global counterparts.
First, where political issues impede participation in global treaties, a regional agreement may be the only viable solution in the near term. The series of agreements between Argentina and Brazil regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon programs provides a good example.
Second, regional agreements can be tailored to meet particular concerns of regional parties. For example, a regional verification regime might be needed for a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, because existing IAEA measures may be perceived as inadequate for assuring compliance.
Third, regional agreements sometimes can be negotiated more rapidly than global agreements. The bilateral Open Skies Agreement between Hungary and Romania and the
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding on the destruction of chemical weapons between the
United States and the former Soviet Union demonstrate this point.
Fourth, some issues are purely regional in nature. While a third party may be requested to monitor compliance with agreements in some regions, such as the demilitarization of the Sinai between Egypt and Israel, some would argue that the Israeli agreement to withdraw from occupied territory is an inherently regional issue. The issue of control over Kashmir is also a largely regional issue between India and Pakistan.
It is important to keep in mind that participation in regional or bilateral agreements does not preclude participation in global arrangements. Indeed, a regional or bilateral regime may be a stepping stone or a necessary first step. It is possible to imagine a global nuclear weapon dismantlement program for which bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, such as START and INF, provide a starting framework.
Long-term effectiveness of regional security agreements ultimately will depend on the commitment and day-to-day involvement of regional parties. Although an external presence may remain important in many regions, it will not obviate the need for a strong indigenous infrastructure for both the development and the implementation of region-specific options for arms control and confidence-building measures. An institutional infrastructure is needed to support the analysis of policy options and the process of negotiating agreements.
Implementation of agreements will require a technical infrastructure that could include the development of monitoring technologies, a communications network for exchanging information, data analysis capabilities and a trained inspector.
Technically-Based Cooperative Monitoring Supports Implementation of Agreements
Implementing agreements often involves technically-based cooperative monitoring. Such monitoring can strengthen existing agreements and set the stage for continued progress. An agreement among two or more countries may bring about a temporary equilibrium in their relations, but energy must be invested to make the equilibrium a lasting one. Investing time and resources in cooperatively monitoring the terms of an agreement can contribute significantly to its stability and permanence. Such an investment signals that the agreement is regarded as important and that countries are committed to its success. Cooperative monitoring also provides a method of openly documenting compliance with the terms of an agreement and makes any act of noncompliance difficult to ignore. Although an external party can assume partial responsibility for monitoring the terms of an agreement, participation of regional parties will strengthen the regime.
Cooperative monitoring involves the collecting, analyzing and sharing of information among parties to an agreement. Technologies incorporated into a cooperative monitoring regime must be sharable among all parties, and all parties must receive equal access to data or information acquired by the system. A cooperative monitoring regime also should include procedures for dealing with anomalous data and false positives. Such procedures are necessary for constructively resolving problems and are likely to involve human presence and activity. There are a number of potential applications for monitoring experiments. These include monitoring of cross-border traffic, demilitarized zones, nuclear facilities, and the environment.
Initially, it might be wise to experiment with monitoring of legitimate, allowed activities, with the intention of establishing mechanisms for providing transparency (or verification) under potential unilateral, regional, or international agreements.
Elements of a Technical Infrastructure
Regardless of the degree to which technology is used in a regional agreement, a technical infrastructure will greatly facilitate implementation. The primary functions will be communication among parties to an agreement, and data collection, analysis and management. Depending on the nature of the confidence building measures and the regional monitoring network, the system could receive data directly from the sensors deployed for cooperative monitoring applications, or such data could be transmitted to the center after being initially processed at local data acquisition centers. The communication network could provide the basis for data transmission and communication of analytic results to local data centers in each country.
Framework for Developing Cooperative Monitoring Options
The design of a cooperative monitoring system is rarely separable from the political process. Balancing political concerns and technical capabilities can be frustrating to technologists accustomed to designing the "best" technical solution. If cooperative monitoring is incorporated into a regional agreement, it is critical to understand the following four issues: (1) the context for a potential agreement, (2) potential or actual provisions of the agreement, (3) observables associated with the provisions, and (4) technical options for monitoring the agreement. forbids the production of a particular item, but does not provide for a verification process, developing cooperative monitoring options will be a moot point.
3. Understanding the observable physical phenomena that can be measured to assess compliance with the provisions of an agreement is an essential step in determining monitoring technologies. Observables include both items or activities limited by the agreement and their observable signatures.
Designing acceptable cooperative monitoring options requires identifying technologies
that can detect relevant observables, weighing the tradeoffs between monitoring intrusiveness and system vulnerability, and considering other constraints, such as costs.
Examples of Regional Arms Control and Confidence Building Agreements
Three examples of arms control and confidence building agreements that have been implemented on a regional basis will be discussed in this section: (1) Table II (page 12) were employed by the SFM to detect activity in the region and to assist analysts in characterizing the nature of the activity. The SFM transmitted detection and characterization data simultaneously to both the Israel and Egyptian signal stations.
Table II. Sensors Employed by the Sinai Field Mission Seismic
The most commonly used type of sensor because of near-ideal conditions in the desert soil. The battery-powered MINISID-III could detect vehicles at 500 m and personnel at 50 m range. It transmitted the seismic signal by radio to an adjacent watch station.
Acoustic
This system was a modular addition to the MINISID-III and used its radio transmission system. A seismic activation of sufficient duration activated the unit which could detect personnel to 30 m and vehicles to 100 m range.
Magnetic
This system was also a modular addition to the MINISID-III and could detect a person with a rifle at 3 -4 m and a medium truck at 15 -20 m.
Strain
A strain sensitive cable was buried under roads and main trails and could be up to several hundred meters long. The compression caused by the passage of an object induced a signal proportional to weight to be generated and transmitted to a watch station.
Infrared

Break-Beam
The directional infrared intrusion detector (DIRID) was also used to monitor roads and large paths. The system consisted of a transmitter and receiver for two parallel infrared beams. DIRID was mounted on tripods above ground and could monitor a space 3 to 17 m wide. Passage of an object through the beam broke the circuit and caused an activation. The order of beam breakage indicated the direction of movement.
Video
Low light TV cameras with transmission to the base camp were used in locations beyond visual line of sight.
Imaging Infrared A prototype system called Passive Confirming Scanner was used during 1977-78 to counter low-visibility conditions in dust and fog. The system was removed because of unacceptable reliability.
The system performed quite reliably although periodic refinements were necessary. On 
Agreement on Monitoring Nuclear Facilities: Brazil and Argentina
Context
Although nuclear arms control in Latin America had been debated since the early 1960s, there was resistance in both countries to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is at least partly due to the perception that the treaty unfairly divided the world into nuclear "haves"
and "have-nots," and provided insufficient restrictions on the nuclear programs of the former group. Both countries had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a Latin American nuclear weapons free zone agreement, but had not brought it into force. Contentious issues included the transport of nuclear weapons through the zone and the interpretation of peaceful nuclear explosions permitted by the treaty. Throughout this debate, both countries continued nuclear weapon programs, building research and power reactors, nuclear test facilities and missile delivery systems.
After decades of military rule, the 1980s brought a change to civilian government for both Argentina and Brazil. At the same time, export control regulations enacted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group increased the pressure to place nuclear facilities under full scope safeguards.
Neither economy was healthy and new governments in both countries wished to redirect resources to domestic problems. The time was ripe for cooperation and confidence building on nuclear issues. 
Provisions
The first of a series of agreements specifying provisions for the joint monitoring of nuclear facilities and material was enacted in 1990. Over the next five years, the degree of cooperative monitoring of nuclear facilities gradually increased. In 1991, the countries signed the Argentine-Brazilian Accord on Nuclear Energy, in which they agreed to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes and to prohibit the test, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Peaceful nuclear explosions were also prohibited, as being indistinguishable from weapons tests. The agreement also provided for the exchange of descriptive lists of all nuclear facilities, declarations of nuclear material inventories, and reciprocal inspections of centralized register systems. The observing party can use either its own aircraft or one of the host state's.
Monitoring Equipment
Sensors were limited to optical and video cameras possessed by both parties.
However, provisions were made to allow updating the sensor annex to accommodate new types of sensors.
Procedures and Restrictions
A request to use the host country's aircraft must be submitted seven days in advance.
Overflights in hazardous airspace (e.g., artillery ranges) are to be publicly announced and have special flight planning.
Preflight inspection of the aircraft by the observed country may last no longer than eight hours, and must be completed at least three hours before the start of the flight.
The quota of flights is four per year in each country.
The distance and duration of flights is limited to 1,200 km or three hourswhichever comes first.
Repeated passes over a site or loitering by the aircraft is prohibited.
Data Exchange
Two sets of camera films will be developed jointly by technicians at a designated facility in the host country. The observing country takes possession of one film and the host country retains the other. If dual sensors are unavailable, a copy of the original material is given to the observing country.
Resolution of Disputes
A Consultative Commission was established to modify provisions where the treaty allows updates and to resolve disputes that may arise in the course of implementing the agreement. Disputes regarding findings are resolved at the ministerial level.
Observables
Since there are no treaty-limited activities or items, observables are not related to treaty provisions in the usual manner. However, the military equipment and activities are the primary concerns of parties to Open Skies agreements. In choosing the appropriate technology, its value for detecting such equipment and activities will be the deciding factor.
Monitoring
In preparation for entry into force of the treaty, a demonstration flight was performed in The flight covered military facilities in both countries and included a military college with weapons displayed for this flight, an exercise ground, an abandoned Soviet air base , an operating military airfield, a civilian airfield, a railroad junction, and an ammunition depot.
Panchromatic film was used to facilitate rapid development and copying. Video cameras were not used because neither air force had experience with their installation and use in aircraft. The average flight altitude over Hungary was 4,500 feet, but weather conditions in Romania required an average altitude of 1,000 feet with excursions to 800 feet to produce photographs of acceptable quality. Problems occurred with navigation because flight crews lacked detailed charts of sites to be overflown and the multinational crew had difficulty communicating. Neither country expected such major navigational problems, but the trial flight was still considered to be successful.
Multilateral Open Skies negotiations reconvened in September 1991, and significant progress was made in narrowing differences on policy and technical issues. The momentum of the successful Hungary-Romania agreement supported the constructive pace of the discussions.
The same fundamental issues that Hungary and Romania had faced in their bilateral talks were addressed and compromises were made over the type of sensors to be used, the ownership of aircraft, data processing and distribution, and the geographic scope. The treaty was signed in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. Hungary and Romania have continued their bilateral overflight regime.
Lessons Learned
Four categories of lessons learned from these agreements can be applied to security discussions in other regions: (1) the relationship of regional agreements to multilateral or global agreements; (2) the importance of setting a pace commensurate with regional political conditions; (3) the contribution of technically-based cooperative monitoring to the implementation of agreements; and (4) the value of regional participation in monitoring the terms of agreements.
Relationship of Regional to Multilateral or Global Agreements
Although none of the agreements discussed in this section are devoid of international participation, the degree to which extra-regional parties are involved is highly variable. The
United States played a key role in negotiating and monitoring the agreement for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and the United Nations was an important presence during implementation. In addition, both sides monitored compliance individually with their own national means. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, only after years of bilateral agreements did they involve the IAEA in the process. International inspections supplement those performed by the bilateral ABACC. In the case of the bilateral Open Skies regime, the bilateral accord was attained as a substitute for a multilateral regime, and stimulated progress in the multilateral forum. There are no plans to subsume the bilateral agreement under the multilateral one when it enters into force.
When regions have a serious concern, they are unlikely to relegate the negotiation and monitoring of an agreement totally to an international body. Most will want direct involvement in assuring compliance. In the case of agreements affecting more states than the parties to the agreement, such as agreements involving weapons of mass destruction, the parties are likely to want to assure the international community of their compliance with global norms. In such cases, some stamp of approval from an international body will probably be required. This does not mean that the region must give up regional monitoring arrangements. However, they may need to coordinate their procedures with an international body and provide it with supporting data.
There is growing recognition that bilateral or regional inspections may offer efficient options for achieving the goals of multilateral agreements. For example, the Chemical Weapons 
Setting the Proper Pace
Great patience may be required when negotiating agreements with profound consequences for the national security of participating countries. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, first steps focused on technical cooperation on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Only much later were defense-related nuclear facilities discussed, and the first steps only involved exchange visits by the heads of state. Small efforts in technical collaboration and acknowledgment of activities grew into the renunciation of nuclear defense activities and the implementation of safeguards on nuclear material and facilities throughout Argentina and Brazil. This may be a model for nuclear arms control in other regions, such as the Middle East.
A step-by-step approach was also pursued in the series of agreements between Egypt and
Israel. Only after successful monitoring of the initial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai did the sides feel confident enough in the situation to sign the Camp David Peace Accord.
In the case of the bilateral Open Skies agreement between Hungary and Romania, the perception by both sides of the immediate need for greater transparency led to rapid negotiation and implementation of an agreement.
Contributions of Technically-Based Cooperative Monitoring
Technically-based cooperative monitoring was utilized by all agreements discussed in the previous section. These technical monitoring systems provide objective data relevant to the terms of the agreements, on which compliance decisions can be based. The data can also be shared with the international community, if desired, to assure others of adherence to certain agreements. Although Israel and Egypt continued to utilize their own national capabilities to monitor the disengagement process, they also jointly relied on shared data provided by the Sinai Field Mission. Another key observation is that technical monitoring can be pursued incrementally. The
Hungary-Romania bilateral overflight negotiations were successful, in part, because the participants choose to fashion an agreement that recognized available resources but retained the option for future improvements. This incremental approach, using cost-effectiveness as a guide, enabled constructive measures to be taken at a politically sensitive time. Neither country could afford elaborate aircraft or sensor systems. Simple aircraft, familiar to both countries, were chosen which eased the task of procedural definition and preflight inspection. Relatively simple and available optical and video sensors were selected. The use of panchromatic film simplified data processing and exchange. As time has passed, improvements, such as the digitization of image information, have been implemented with the help of third parties such as France.
Regional Participation Critical for Success
The success of all three agreements discussed here is largely attributable to the active participation of regional parties in their negotiation and implementation. In no case was an agreement imposed on the region by an outside body or international organization; although the to note that Sandia's role is to help users of the Center acquire the tools to design monitoring systems to fit their needs, not to provide them with technology. Therefore, developing partnerships with industry may be needed to establish avenues for regional parties to obtain systems they design.
The Center sponsors sabbaticals, workshops, and training classes aimed at developing solutions to specific problems. It also provides facilities for collaborations on the use of technology in enhancing the effectiveness of transparency and confidence-building measures.
Since its establishment, the center has conducted two major workshops on cooperative monitoring. The first workshop was developed for Middle Eastern participants and was attended by representatives from Israel, Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar, and Oman, as well as U.S. academic and government nonproliferation specialists. The second workshop, which focused on South Asia, was attended by Pakistani representatives as well as South Asia scholars from the United States.
The Center also has hosted visits by numerous groups of scientists from the Former Soviet Union, a delegation from South Korea and a group from Northeast Asia studying nuclear weapon free zones. During the next year, academics and scientists from many different countries will collaborate with Center experts on formulating options for monitoring regional agreements. The
Center's objective is to encourage workshop participants to take a critical interest in making their own choices, rather than to prescribe "the correct solution" for their problems. Tradeoffs between monitoring intrusiveness and system vulnerability are discussed in detail.
